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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 For nearly fifty years, a war has been raging in courts throughout 
this country. The opponents are as follows: the tobacco industry and 
plaintiffs alleging smoking-related injuries. Until recently, the to-
bacco industry had won every battle in this ongoing war. In fact, no 
smoker recovered damages via verdict or settlement against a to-
bacco company until the 1990s.1 However, the tide of this great legal 
battle has shifted. 
 Recently, in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Florida, a trial con-
cluded that is easily the most stunning victory for plaintiffs alleging 
smoking-related injuries in the long line of battles against the to-
                                                                                                                  
 * J.D., Florida State University College of Law, 2001; B.A. Baylor University, 1996. 
This Note is dedicated to my parents, Mr. & Mrs. Hugh D. Barr, Jr., for their continuous 
love and support throughout my life. I thank Michael Wenger, the Florida State University 
Law Review editorial staff, and Mr. Martin Levin for their assistance in the publication of 
this Note. A special thanks goes to my fiance, Pam. For her contributions and support to 
my life, she has my undying love and never-ending thanks. 
 1. See Hanoch Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and Injurious In-
dustries, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 360 (2000). The actual numbe rs are even more staggering. 
During the period of 1954 through 1994, 821 suits were filed against the tobacco industry; 
not a single one of those cases resulted in monetary recovery for a plaintiff. See Michael 
Orey, Litigation at a Crossroads: Litigation to Watch in 1995, AM. LAW., May 1995, at 38, 
38.  
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bacco industry. The case was Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,2 a 
class action suit that resulted in a punitive damages award of an un-
precedented $144.8 billion.3 Seeking to punish the tobacco industry 
for the wrongs it committed against all injured smokers in Florida, 
this enormous award will, if affirmed upon appeal, eventually be 
paid to all qualified members of the Engle class, a class estimated to 
be comprised of 500,000 Florida residents. 4 
 While the amount of the award alone makes Engle a remarkable 
event, easily the largest award in United States history, the Engle 
case represents much more than just a vast amount of money.5 In 
fact, Engle was an historic action long before the job of assessing pu-
nitive damages was even handed to the jury. Engle made history by 
becoming the first certified class action for injured smokers to ever 
reach a trial. 6 The case also made history when the jury broke from 
the status quo by finding the tobacco industry liable for injuries 
caused to Florida smokers7 and awarding compensatory damages to 
three representative class members. 8 These results alone established 
Engle as quite possibly the greatest threat ever to the tobacco indus-
try. However, despite the historic events surrounding this case, the 
                                                                                                                  
 2. No. 94-08273 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 2000) (Trial record on file with author). 
 3. See Final Judgment and Amended Omnibus Order, Engle v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco 
Co., No. 94-08273 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2000), http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/ 
tobacco/englerjfinaljudorder.pdf; see also Myron Levin, Jury Awards $145 Billion in 
Landmark Tobacco Case, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 2000, at A1. 
 4. See Richard Willing, Smokers’ Suit Could Have Far-Reaching Implications, USA 
TODAY, July 6, 1999, at A3. 
 5. See George Bennett, Tobacco Industry Told to Pay $145 Billion, PALM BCH. POST, 
July 15, 2000, at A1. The Engle award is actually seven times larger than the previous re-
cord holder of $22 billion against the estate of Ferdinand Marcos. See id. The award 
against Marcos was subsequently overturned on appeal. See Roxas v. Marcos, 969 P.2d 
1209 (Haw. 1998). 
 6. See Milo Geyelin, In Florida a Vast Tobacco Case Looms, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 
1998, at B1. The first class action to be certified was a nationwide class based on injuries 
caused by smoker’s addiction to nicotine. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 
544 (E.D. La. 1995). However, this class was quickly decertified by the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeal. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). Following the 
decertification of Castano, innovative plaintiffs’ lawyers filed actions in individual state 
courts, thereby limiting the class to a statewide class. See infra text accompanying notes 
127 and 128. Engle is the first class action to reach a trial based on damages caused to 
smokers by addiction to nicotine. A previous class action, Broin v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 641 
So. 2d 888 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), was the first class action against the tobacco industry to 
reach trial. See Ingrid L. Dietsch Field, No Ifs, Ands or Butts: Big Tobacco is Fighting for 
Its Life Against a New Breed of Plaintiffs Armed with Mounting Evidence, 27 U. BALT. L. 
REV. 99, 116 (1997). However, Broin dealt with injuries caused by secondhand smoke to 
flight attendants, not injuries caused directly to smokers. See id. 
 7. See Verdict Form for Phase I, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273 
(Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. June 17, 1999) (on file with author).  
 8. See Verdict Form for Phase II, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273 
(Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Apr. 7, 2000) (on file with author). The jury awarded a total of $12.7 mil-
lion in compensatory damages to three representative class members in the second phase 
of the Engle trial. See id. 
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nation did not take notice of Engle until the jury sent a shockwave 
through the United States by awarding $144.8 billion in punitive 
damages to the entire Engle class. 9 
 Although many aspects of the Engle case were controversial, such 
as the certification of the class, the plan set in place by the trial court 
concerning the assessment of punitive damages caused some of the 
most concern. While damages must usually be assessed individu-
ally,10 the Engle trial plan instructed the jury to assess punitive 
damages in one lump sum to the entire Engle class prior to the as-
sessment of compensatory damages for individual class members. 11 
The controversy was that the tobacco companies would be ordered to 
pay punitive damages to a class of an estimated 500,000 members 
prior to determining the actual damages caused to individual class 
members. This would set up a situation in which each class member 
who later proves individual liability in the third and final phase of 
the Engle trial plan would become entitled to an equal portion of the 
punitive damages award irrespective of the amount of harm caused. 
 Based on the argument that the Engle trial plan violated Florida 
law and the tobacco industry’s due process rights, the tobacco indus-
try appealed to the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida in an at-
tempt to stop the trial court’s plan for the assessment of punitive 
damages. Initially, the Third District Court ruled in favor of the to-
bacco industry and quashed the trial court’s order permitting the as-
sessment of lump sum punitive damages prior to a determination of 
compensatory damages and stated that “the issue of damages, both 
compensatory and punitive, must be tried on an individual basis.”12 
However, just two weeks later, the Third District Court vacated this 
ruling and set a date for oral argument on the issue.13 Following oral 
argument, the Third District Court reversed course and allowed the 
trial court to assess punitive damages prior to the assessment of 
compensatory damages. 14 The Florida Supreme Court subsequently 
denied the tobacco industry’s petition for relief.15 However, the peti-
                                                                                                                  
 9. See Final Judgment and Amended Omnibus Order, Engle v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco 
Co., No. 94-08273 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2000), http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/ 
tobacco/englerjfinaljudorder.pdf; see also Levin, supra note 3. 
 10. See generally Developments in the Law—Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 
1517-23 (1976) (discussing the various methods courts employ for calculating and distrib-
uting damages in class action lawsuits).   
 11. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2061 (Fla. 3d DCA 
Sept. 3, 1999) (quashing the trial court’s order permitting the jury to assess lump sum pu-
nitive damages), vacated, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2192 (Fla. 3d DCA Sept. 17, 1999). 
 12. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2061 (Fla. 3d DCA Sept. 
3, 1999). 
 13. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2192 (Fla. 3d DCA 
Sept. 17, 1999). 
 14. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2392 (Fla. 3d DCA 
Oct. 20, 1999). 
 15. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 751 So. 2d 51, 51 (Fla. 1999). 
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tion was denied without prejudice so that the tobacco companies 
could raise this issue in any direct appeal.16 
 This Note will discuss the legality of this trial plan under both 
Florida law and federal constitutional law and the likely outcome of 
any postverdict appeals. The Note will begin, in Part II, by giving a 
history of tobacco litigation in the United States and placing the 
Engle case in perspective with the litigation that preceded it. In Part 
III, the background of Engle will be discussed, from the implementa-
tion of the current trial plan to the record award of punitive dam-
ages. Part IV will discuss federal constitutional law on punitive 
damages, focusing particularly on the due process requirements sur-
rounding the assessment of punitive damages. Part IV will also re-
view Florida law on the assessment of punitive damages as it stood 
when the trial of Engle began. Finally, in Part V, the principles of 
both federal constitutional and Florida law will be applied to Engle, 
and the Note will discuss the likely outcome of any subsequent ap-
peal. 
II.   THE HISTORY OF TOBACCO LITIGATION 
 To fully understand the importance of Engle, the case must be put 
in perspective by reviewing the history of tobacco litigation. For 
nearly fifty years, litigation attempting to hold the tobacco industry 
accountable for its actions has been pursued in the courts of this 
country. This history has traditionally been discussed as occurring in 
three separate waves.17 Each wave in this history represents the ap-
plication of different legal theories and strategies by both the tobacco 
plaintiffs and the tobacco industry.18 The first two waves were a com-
plete wipeout by the tobacco industry. However, with the advent of 
the third wave, the tobacco plaintiffs finally hit upon a successful 
combination of strategy and theory. 
A.   The First Wave of Tobacco Litigation 
 In 1953, the public began to receive news of studies from the sci-
entific community establishing a relationship between smoking and 
cancer.19 This news was the catalyst of the first wave of tobacco liti-
                                                                                                                  
 16. See id. 
 17. See Maria Gabriela Bianchini, The Tobacco Agreement That Went Up in Smoke: 
Defining the Limits of Congressional Intervention into Ongoing Mass Tort Litigation, 87 
CAL. L. REV. 703, 710 (1999). See, e.g., Susan E. Kearns, Note, Decertification of Statewide 
Tobacco Class Actions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1336, 1338 (1999). 
 18. See Bianchini, supra note 17, at 710; Kearns, supra note 17, at 1338. 
 19. See Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. 
L. REV. 853, 856 (1992). These findings reached the public when they were published in 
the Journal of the American Medical Association and The Reader’s Digest. See id. 
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gation.20 During this wave nearly 150 suits were filed; however, the 
great majority of them were dropped without formal disposition.21 
Only ten cases reached trials, and the jury ruled for the tobacco in-
dustry in all of them. 22 Obviously, the disposal of nearly 150 cases 
without being forced to pay out a cent in damages is an extraordinary 
achievement. This achievement was a direct result of the legal theo-
ries adopted by the plaintiffs and the defense strategies adopted by 
the tobacco industry. 
 The tobacco industry made the express decision to vigorously de-
fend every suit and refuse to even consider offers of settlement. 23 In 
implementing this vigorous defense policy, the tobacco industry gen-
erally established two very effective lines of defense. The first line of 
defense was to “spare no cost in exhausting their adversaries’ re-
sources” and to financially overcome each of the plaintiffs prior to the 
trial phase in each case.24 This line of defense was successful because 
first-wave plaintiffs were generally litigating alone and the heavy 
costs of maintaining suit eventually overburdened the plaintiffs’ law-
yers.25 As the tobacco companies predicted, most plaintiffs’ lawyers 
were forced to drop their cases simply as a result of a negative cash 
flow.26 This strategy was also effective because the tobacco companies 
made litigation so expensive that no lawyer representing a single 
plaintiff on a contingency fee basis could afford to maintain the case. 
Quite simply, the lawyer’s costs would far exceed any potential gain 
from a favorable verdict.27 Thus, it was a very difficult burden to 
overcome the pretrial financial hurdles put in place by the tobacco 
industry. However, the prospects of recovery were not any better for 
the few cases that survived to trial. 
                                                                                                                  
 20. See id. at 857. Plaintiffs’ suits during the first wave of tobacco litigation were 
based on both negligence and warranty theories. See id. at 859-60. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See Dietsch Field, supra note 6, at 101. 
 23. See Rabin, supra note 19, at 857-58. 
 24. Id. at 857. 
 25. See id. at 858. Professor Rabin’s description of the lone personal injury lawyer 
during the first wave is as follows: 
Personal injury lawyers were, for the most part, lone wolves. They practiced 
alone or in very small firms, relying on the quick disposition of a high turn-over 
caseload to survive—in some instances, to flourish—in a contingency fee sys-
tem. Heavy front-end costs, which cannot realistically be recouped in a losing 
case from an impecunious client, are a major disincentive to involvement in 
high-risk cases. So, too, are lengthy pretrial delays without prospect of settle-
ment; cash-flow concerns are endemic to contingency fee representation. 
Id. 
 26. See id. at 859. 
 27. See Tucker S. Player, Note, After the Fall: The Cigarette Papers, the Global Set-
tlement, and the Future of Tobacco Litigation, 49 S.C. L. REV. 311, 313 (1998). 
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 The reward of surviving the financial maze put in place by the to-
bacco industry was a verdict for the defense.28 During the first wave 
of suits, which were filed based on negligence and warranty theories, 
the tobacco industry successfully argued to the jury that the risk of 
harm caused to the plaintiffs by smoking was not foreseeable.29 In 
stark contrast to the later waves of tobacco litigation, juries consis-
tently found that even though the injuries at issue were due to can-
cer caused by smoking cigarettes, the risk of injury could not have 
been foreseen by the tobacco industry.30 Because the tobacco compa-
nies could not foresee that their products created a risk of harm, the 
companies could not be held liable for any injury caused by their 
products. 31 Because the plaintiffs’ suits were based on theories of neg-
ligence and breach of warranty, and courts were hesitant to allow 
claims of strict liability, a finding of unforeseeability prevented re-
covery.32 
 The end of the first wave was signaled in 1965 with the adoption 
and publication of the Second Restatement of the Law of Torts.33 The 
Restatement discussed the requirements necessary to find a manu-
facturer liable for a defective product. The writers of the Restatement 
felt that for liability to attach, products must be both in a defective 
condition and unreasonably dangerous.34 Under the Restatement 
view, while cigarettes were felt to be unreasonably dangerous, they 
were not considered to be defective.35 This view was best summed up 
by a Restatement comment where the writers stated that “[g]ood to-
bacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of 
smoking may be harmful; but tobacco containing something like 
marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous.”36 This comment effec-
tively ended the first wave of tobacco litigation as it gave the tobacco 
companies nearly per se immunity against suit. 37 
                                                                                                                  
 28. The tobacco companies maintained their strategy of placing an extreme financial 
burden on the plaintiff once the case reached trial. As a result, of the 10 cases that reached 
trial, four were dropped at some point during the trial. See Rabin, supra note 19, at 860. 
 29. See id. at 860-61. In the later waves, the primary dispute revolved around causa-
tion. See id. However, in the first wave, “juries seemed to accept the evidence of a generic 
link between smoking and cancer.” Id. at 860.   
 30. See Dietsch Field, supra note 6, at 105-06. 
 31. See Rabin, supra note 19, at 861. 
 32. See id. at 859. Although foreseeability is not required to find a manufacturer li-
able in a breach of implied warranty action, courts during this period did not hold a favor-
able view of true strict liability. See id. at 861. In fact, as announced in possibly the leading 
case of the first wave, the manufacturer “is an insurer against foreseeable risks—but not 
against unknowable risks.” Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 37 (5th Cir. 
1963). 
 33. See Rabin, supra note 19, at 864; Player, supra note 27, at 314. 
 34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965); see also Rabin, supra 
note 19, at 863. 
 35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Player, supra note 27, at 314. 
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 As the first wave of tobacco litigation came to a close, running 
from roughly 1954-65, the tobacco industry had defeated the plain-
tiffs in every suit filed and had sent a strong message to any poten-
tial plaintiffs contemplating suit. Evidently, the plaintiffs received 
the tobacco industry’s message as it took nearly twenty years for the 
second wave of tobacco litigation to begin. 
B.   The Second Wave of Tobacco Litigation 
 When the second wave of tobacco litigation began in the early 
1980s, great strides had been made in attempts to prove the link be-
tween smoking and cancer. The first such stride was the U.S. Sur-
geon General’s Report of 1964.38 Due to this report, “[t]he connection 
between smoking and cancer was now firmly implanted in the minds 
of Americans.”39 In response, Congress passed two new acts on smok-
ing: the 1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (1965 
Cigarette Act);40 and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 
1969 (1969 Cigarette Act).41 These three events firmly engrained in 
the heads of the American public that cigarette smoking was danger-
ous and unhealthy.42 
 Like the American public, the plaintiffs’ attorneys who handled 
the second wave of tobacco litigation also learned a great deal be-
tween the end of the first wave and the beginning of the second. One 
major development leading to the beginning of the second wave of to-
bacco litigation was the rise of mass tort litigation—particularly as-
bestos litigation.43 The rise of asbestos litigation gave the future to-
bacco attorneys extensive experience in effectively establishing the 
causal link between smoking and cancer.44 Ironically, the experience 
was gathered arguing that the cause of cancer in the asbestos cases 
                                                                                                                  
 38. See id. (citing PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH,  EDUCATION & 
WELFARE, PUB. NO. 1103, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO 
THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 26 (1964)). While this report was 
originally viewed as good evidence of a causal link between smoking and cancer and bene-
ficial to plaintiffs, the report ended up being a good line of defense for the tobacco industry. 
The results of the report became common knowledge and were good support for the argu-
ment that the plaintiffs knew the dangers of smoking and had assumed the risk. 
 39. Player, supra note 27, at 315. 
 40. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 283 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 
(1994)). This legislation made it unlawful to “manufacture, package, or import for sale or 
distribution within the United States any cigarettes the package of which fails to bear” 
warnings on the effects of tobacco use. Id. 
 41. Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 88 (1969) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1994)). This 
legislation included the following preemption clause: “No requirement or prohibition based 
on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or 
promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provi-
sions of this chapter.” Id. 
 42. See Rabin, supra note 19, at 864. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. at 865.  
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was solely asbestos exposure and not the exposure to smoking.45 The 
plaintiffs’ attorneys then solved the major problem of the first 
wave—the cost of litigating against the tobacco industry—by pooling 
resources with other attorneys instead of acting alone.46 Further, the 
plaintiffs no longer had to worry about the problem of foreseeability 
because strict liability, which focused on the intrinsically dangerous 
nature of a product, was now fully accepted in products liability 
law.47 However, even with all of these new found advantages, by the 
close of the second wave and the filing of 175-200 cases,48 the tobacco 
industry would still be able to proclaim that “after thirty-five years of 
litigation, . . . it had not paid out a cent in tort awards.”49 
 In continuing its impressive winning streak, the tobacco industry 
relied on one of its favorite defenses from the first wave and devel-
oped several new theories of defense to combat the unique legal theo-
ries being applied by the plaintiffs. The tobacco industry’s first line of 
defense was, as in the first wave, to wear down the plaintiffs by sim-
ply making the litigation more expensive than the prospect of any re-
covery.50 While the pooling of resources allowed many more plaintiffs 
in the second wave to reach the trial stage than in the first wave, the 
strategy of financially wearing down the plaintiffs was still an effec-
tive way to eliminate many cases.51 However, the most effective pre-
trial strategy was no longer to try to overextend the finances of the 
plaintiff but to argue that federal law preempted the plaintiffs’ 
claims. 52 Still, while these were two large hurdles for the plaintiffs to 
overcome, the prospects of reaching trial were much better than in 
the first wave. Yet, once a case reached trial, the plaintiffs had to 
                                                                                                                  
 45. See id.  
 46. See id. at 866. 
 47. See id. The most common form of strict liability in tort was the form adopted by 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A. Under section 402A: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous 
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical 
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and  
(b) it is expected to and does reach the consumer without substantial change in 
the condition in which it was sold. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965). The doctrine of strict liability in 
tort as stated in section 402A was adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in 1976. See West 
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 87 (Fla. 1976). The plaintiffs also had the advan-
tage of the comparative fault principle in that some of the risks of smoking could be as-
sumed by the plaintiff without losing the right to recover. See Rabin, supra note 19, at 866. 
 48. See Rabin supra note 19, at 867 n.88. 
 49. Id. at 874. 
 50. See id. at 867-68. 
 51. See id. at 868. 
 52. See Player, supra note 27, at 318. The argument was simply that the 1965 and 
1969 Cigarette Acts preempted all state common law damages claims. Allowing these 
claims would effectively force the tobacco companies to apply different warnings on their 
cigarette packaging and advertising and thus circumvent the purpose of Congress. See id. 
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overcome the two great trial arguments of the tobacco industry: cau-
sation and assumption of risk.53 
 These two arguments were simply too much for the plaintiffs to 
overcome. In arguing causation, the tobacco industry began by “at-
tacking the plaintiff and his lifestyle” to show that perhaps tobacco 
use was not the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.54 The tobacco compa-
nies would then present their own independent research to challenge 
the reports linking tobacco use to cancer.55 Based on this evidence, 
many juries had difficulty believing that tobacco use was the legal 
cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries. 56 Still, even if the plaintiffs were able 
to convince the jury that smoking was the legal cause of injury, the 
plaintiffs had to convince juries that they had not assumed the risk 
of smoking. 
 The most effective trial argument of the tobacco industry in the 
second wave was assumption of risk.57 Because the general public 
considered it common knowledge that smoking caused cancer, the to-
bacco lawyers simply argued that plaintiffs knew smoking was po-
tentially dangerous and chose to do it anyway.58 The plaintiffs unsuc-
cessfully tried to deflect this argument by arguing that, while they 
had assumed some risk, addiction to the nicotine in tobacco products 
prevented smokers from making an informed decision on whether to 
smoke.59 At the very least, plaintiffs argued that the tobacco industry 
must be held partly liable.60 However, juries were not impressed with 
these arguments and generally found that the plaintiffs were totally 
to blame for their injuries. 61 
 Still, despite all of the disappointments of the second wave, the 
plaintiffs did not suffer a total loss. In 1988, the first jury verdict or-
dering a tobacco company to pay damages to an injured smoker was 
entered in Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.62 The jury in Cippollone 
found the tobacco companies were 20% liable for the injuries to the 
plaintiff, Rose Cippollone, but, because New Jersey law required a 
finding of 50% liability to allow recovery, no damages were awarded 
                                                                                                                  
 53. See id. at 316-17. 
 54. Id. at 316. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. at 317. 
 57. See id.  
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. at 317-18.  
 60. See id. 
 61. See id. at 317. A good example of this type of reaction is the case of Horton v. 
American Tobacco Co., No. 12325 (Miss. Cir. Ct. Nov. 2, 1990). In Horton, the jury found 
that the American Tobacco Company was at fault for the plaintiff’s injuries, but denied the 
plaintiff any award of damages. See Rabin, supra note 19, at 871. 
 62. 693 F. Supp. 208, 210 (D.N.J. 1988). The estate of Rose Cippollone brought suit for 
injuries allegedly sustained from smoking cigarettes manufactured by Liggett Group. See 
id. 
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for Mrs. Cippollone’s injuries. 63 However, the jury awarded $400,000 
in damages to Mrs. Cippollone’s husband for his claim of wrongful 
death.64 It appeared that the plaintiffs had ended the tobacco indus-
try’s impressive winning streak; however, the brief success enjoyed 
by this verdict was not to last. 
 Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit overturned the jury award and held that all common law 
damages claims were preempted by the 1965 and 1969 Cigarette 
Acts. 65 The U.S. Supreme Court then granted certiorari to resolve the 
issue of preemption as it concerned the 1965 and 1969 Cigarette 
Acts. 66 In its ruling, the Court held that all common law damages 
claims were not preempted by the Cigarette Acts and found the fol-
lowing: 1) the 1965 Cigarette Act did not preempt state common law 
damages claims; 67 2) the 1969 Cigarette Act did preempt state com-
mon law damage claims for failure to warn;68 and 3) the 1969 Ciga-
rette Act did not preempt claims of express warranty, intentional 
fraud and misrepresentation, or conspiracy.69 Cippollone was then 
remanded for a new trial. 70 While this appeared to be good news for 
the Cippollone family, the enormous expense of pursuing the case up 
to the Supreme Court, about $6.2 million,71 forced the Cippollones’ 
lawyers to drop the suit.72 
 Cippollone marked the end of the second wave of tobacco litiga-
tion.73 While the plaintiffs had obtained their first favorable jury ver-
dict, in terms of actual recovery, the plaintiffs had failed to recover 
any compensation from the tobacco industry. Further, this lone fa-
vorable verdict was not for injuries caused to a smoker, as the jury 
felt the smoker was to blame for her injuries, but was for a wrongful 
death claim by the smoker’s spouse. Thus, it appeared the only way 
for the plaintiffs to overcome the defense of assumption of risk and 
convince the jury that they were not to blame would be to prove a 
mass cover-up and conspiracy. However, after forty years of litiga-
tion, plaintiffs had thus far failed to recover the proverbial smoking 
gun from internal tobacco industry documents. 74 If such an internal 
document could be found, perhaps juries would no longer believe that 
                                                                                                                  
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 581-82 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 66. See Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 499 U.S. 935 (1991). 
 67. See Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 519-20 (1992). 
 68. See id. at 524. 
 69. See id. at 531. 
 70. See id. 
 71. See Dietsch Field, supra note 6, at 114. 
 72. See Richard A. Daynard & Graham E. Kelder, Jr., The Many Virtues of Tobacco 
Litigation, TRIAL, Nov. 1, 1998, at 34, 36. 
 73. See Player, supra note 27, at 319.  
 74. See Rabin, supra note 19, at 875. 
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the plaintiffs had assumed the risk of smoking. However, the pros-
pect of finding such a document seemed so bleak that one leading 
commentator lamented at the close of the second wave that “[w]hile 
it is possible that a new wave of lawsuits would unearth egregious 
evidence of a cover-up, it seems unlikely.”75 
C.   The Third Wave of Tobacco Litigation 
 The predictions of the plaintiffs’ inability to prove a mass cover-up 
turned out to be incorrect. Not only would plaintiffs be able to prove 
a mass cover-up, the third wave of tobacco litigation would bring the 
first real successes against the tobacco industry. Ironically, the only 
permanent successes have been enormous settlements—an abrupt 
shift in strategy from the first two waves of litigation when the to-
bacco companies refused to even consider settlement. 
 There are many causes to this recent turnaround. First, the plain-
tiffs are now applying strategies intended to prevent the tobacco in-
dustry from taking advantage of its superior financial position. This 
has been done largely through the filing of large class actions, case-
management orders designed to prevent the tobacco industry from 
causing inordinate delay, and lawsuits by state governments for re-
imbursement of state funds spent on healthcare for smoking-related 
injuries. 76 In addition, plaintiffs are now able to take advantage of a 
wealth of internal tobacco documents that prove the one thing that 
can overcome the past problems of causation and assumption of 
risk—a long-running conspiracy by the tobacco industry. 
 The first documents became available to the plaintiffs on May 12, 
1994, when a box of documents belonging to the Brown and William-
son Tobacco Company, known collectively as the Cigarette Papers, 
was anonymously sent to Professor Stanton Glantz at the University 
of California.77 Detailing years of deception and a mass conspiracy to 
cover-up the truths of tobacco use by the entire tobacco industry, the 
Cigarette Papers proved the “egregious cover-up” that commentators 
felt was “unlikely” just two years earlier.78 While these documents 
alone may have been enough to show the deceptive practices of the 
tobacco industry, the tobacco plaintiffs received further proof after 
twenty-two state Attorneys General settled their suits for reim-
bursement of Medicaid expenses with the Liggett & Myers Corpora-
                                                                                                                  
 75. Id. at 875. 
 76. See Daynard & Kelder, supra note 72, at 36.  
 77. See Player, supra note 27, at 322. 
 78. Id. The documents were sent to Professor Glantz by a paralegal working for the 
firm representing Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation. See id. Among other dam-
aging revelations, the documents “detailed over thirty years of fraud and deceit by not only 
[Brown and Williamson] but also the entire tobacco industry. The documents revealed that 
the industry [had] known conclusively since the sixties that tobacco use [was] directly cor-
related with cancer and that . . . nicotine was an addictive drug.” Id.  
798  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:787 
 
tion (hereinafter Liggett & Myers).79 As part of the settlement with 
Liggett & Myers, Bennett LeBow, the corporation’s CEO, agreed to 
publicly affirm that smoking does in fact cause numerous illnesses 
and that the tobacco companies do indeed target children.80 However, 
the biggest contribution of Liggett & Myers was 250,000 pages in 
documents that further implicated the tobacco industry in a mass 
conspiracy.81 
 With these documents in hand and the protection of court orders 
forcing the tobacco industry to litigate without excessive delay, indi-
vidual plaintiffs finally began to defeat the great trial arguments of 
the tobacco industry and obtain favorable jury verdicts. The first 
such verdict was entered by a Florida jury in Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp. v. Carter.82 The Carter jury was the first to decide a 
case during the third wave, and by no coincidence, was also the first 
jury to hear the information provided in the Cigarette Papers. 83 How-
ever, the great hopes of success in the third wave for individual 
plaintiffs were dimmed when the jury’s verdict assessing $750,000 in 
damages was overturned on appeal.84 
 Shortly after Carter, another verdict assessing damages against 
the tobacco company occurred in the case of Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp. v. Widdick.85 This time another Florida jury found in 
favor of the plaintiff and assessed damages of $950,000 against 
Brown & Williamson.86 Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, Widdick, like 
Carter, remained true to the history of tobacco litigation and was also 
overturned on appeal.87 However, unlike the second wave of tobacco 
litigation, the prospect of having a favorable verdict overturned on 
appeal has not prevented others from trying to hold the tobacco in-
dustry liable. 
                                                                                                                  
 79. See Dietsch Field, supra note 6, at 122. 
 80. See id. at 122-23. 
 81. See id. at 123. In exchange for these concessions and an agreement to pay 25% of 
its pretax profits for the next 25 years to the states, the suits against Liggett were dropped 
and plaintiffs in those 22 states were barred from suing Liggett. See id. at 123. 
 82. 723 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (discussing the jury verdict handed down in 
Duval County Circuit Court). 
 83. See Daynard & Kelder, supra note 72, at 36. 
 84. See Carter, 723 So. 2d at 836. The Florida First District Court of Appeal held that 
the statute of limitations had run on the plaintiff’s claim. See id. at 836. Fortunately for 
the plaintiff, the Florida Supreme Court subsequently quashed the opinion of the First 
District Court and held that the statute of limitations had not run on the plaintiff’s claim. 
See Carter v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 25 Fla. L. Weekly S1072 (Fla. Nov. 22, 
2000).  
 85. 717 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (discussing the jury verdict handed down in 
Duval County Circuit Court). 
 86. See Noreen Marcus, Big Tobacco’s Victory Record Remains Intact, FT. LAUD. SUN 
SENT., June 23, 1998, at B6. 
 87. See Widdick, 717 So. 2d at 573. This time the verdict was overturned because the 
trial court abused its discretion in not granting Brown & Williamson’s motion for change of 
venue. See id. at 573-74. 
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 Since Widdick, several juries outside of Florida have held in favor 
of the plaintiffs and have ordered tobacco companies to pay damages. 
In particular, a California jury assessed damages against the tobacco 
industry in the amount of $51.5 million and an Oregon jury assessed 
damages in the amount of $80.3 million.88 While these judgments 
were subsequently reduced and are currently in the process of ap-
peal, they show that juries are no longer convinced by the arguments 
of the tobacco industry.89 Still, the likelihood of a recovery large 
enough to offset the great expense of bringing tobacco suits to trial 
makes the prospect of successfully bringing suit as an individual 
plaintiff a very risky proposition. However, suits by lone, individual 
plaintiffs are no longer the real threat to the tobacco industry.90 The 
real threat comes in the form of two actions unique to the third wave 
of tobacco litigation: 1) suits filed by individual states to recover state 
Medicaid funds spent on tobacco-related injuries and 2) class actions 
filed on the behalf of mass plaintiffs against the entire tobacco indus-
try. These two types of actions are producing results against the to-
bacco industry that could not have been imagined just a few years 
ago. 
1.   State Actions for Reimbursement of Medicaid Funds 
 The civil actions filed by individual states seeking Medicaid reim-
bursement were the first of the two real threats to produce actual re-
sults against the tobacco industry. Medicaid was established by Title 
XIX of the Social Security Act to serve as a medical assistance pro-
gram.91 Designed to provide medical services for eligible individuals 
through the cooperation of state and federal government, the Medi-
caid program requires the state to “take all reasonable measures to 
ascertain the legal liability of all third parties . . . to pay for care and 
service available under the plan.”92 Thus, a state, as an administra-
tor of the Medicaid program, can state a claim for restitution against 
the tobacco industry when the state was forced to pay the cost of 
treating its citizens for injuries caused by products of the tobacco in-
dustry.93 
 Mississippi was the first state to take advantage of this language 
and filed suit against the tobacco industry on May 23, 1994.94 By 
1997, forty of the fifty states, including Florida, on February 21, 
                                                                                                                  
 88. See Levin, supra note 3. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See Bianchini, supra note 17, at 712. 
 91. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25) (2000). 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Cliff Sherrill, Comment, Tobacco Litigation: Medicaid Third Party Liability 
and Claims for Restitution, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 497, 501 (1997). 
 94. See Dietsch Field, supra note 6, at 116. 
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1995,95 had followed Mississippi’s lead and filed suit seeking to ob-
tain Medicaid reimbursements.96 The theory of recovery underlying 
each individual suit was essentially the same: the tobacco industry 
had allegedly conspired to conceal the addictive nature of nicotine 
and that smoking caused many different types of disease and ill-
ness.97 There were two primary arguments used by the states: 1) the 
state cannot have assumed the risk of smoking as the state was sim-
ply a bystander paying to treat the tobacco-related illnesses of its 
citizens; and 2) the states could prove, largely through the Cigarette 
Papers and the Liggett & Myers documents, that the tobacco indus-
try knew about the health problems associated with smoking, con-
cealed that information and, in fact, manipulated the nicotine levels 
of its products in order to maintain a steady customer base.98 
 By 1996, as a result of the suits filed by the individual states, the 
tobacco industry was forced to defend suits, not against individual 
plaintiffs with limited financial means, but against well-financed 
states with highly damaging evidence in the form of internal indus-
try documents.99 The tobacco industry was finally forced to face the 
great possibility of losing cases and huge judgments being entered 
                                                                                                                  
 95. See Christa Sarafara, Making Tobacco Companies Pay: The Florida Medicaid 
Third-Party Liability Act, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 123, 136 (1997). The State of Flor-
ida went further than just suing the tobacco industry; the Florida Legislature amended 
state law to better the state’s chances of recovering against the tobacco industry. See id. at 
133-34. The amended law specifically precluded any third party who may be liable for 
Medicaid costs from using affirmative defenses like comparative negligence, assumption of 
risk, and “all other affirmative defenses normally available to a liable third party.” FLA. 
STAT. § 409.910(1) (1997) (currently codified at FLA. STAT. § 409.910(1) (2000)). The new 
statute also allowed the state to make a claim for Medicaid reimbursement without having 
to assume the position of the Medicaid recipient or identify each recipient individually. See 
id. As if this were not enough, the amended law eliminated the burden of proving which 
manufacturer caused which specific injury, eliminated the statute of repose, and allowed 
for proof of causation through statistical analysis. See id. The effect of the statute was to 
allow the state to mount an all-out offensive strictly against the tobacco industry. The Flor-
ida Supreme Court explained that Governor Lawton Chiles even “ordered the relevant ex-
ecutive branch officials to pursue the recovery of Medicaid expenditures from only the to-
bacco industry.” Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., 678 So. 2d 
1239, 1246 (Fla. 1996) (citing Fla. Exec. Order No. 95-105 (Mar. 28, 1995). 
 96. See Bianchini, supra note  17, at 712. Suits to recover costs spent by government to 
treat tobacco-related illnesses are not limited to just the individual states. Several foreign 
countries, like Bolivia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Thailand, Venezuela, and Brazil 
have filed suit in American courts. See Dagan & White, supra note 1, at 363 (citing Alison 
Frankel, One Planet, A Multitude of Tobacco Plaintiffs, AM. LAW., Apr. 1999, at 24; Rio 
Sues U.S. Tobacco Firms for Cost of Treating Smokers, WALL ST. J. INTERACTIVE ED., July 
14 1999, http://interactive.wsj.com). In addition, several other foreign countries have filed 
suit in courts within their respective countries. See Dagan & White, supra note 1, at 363 
(citing Saundra Torry, Cigarette Firms Sued by Foreign Governments: Tobacco Industry 
Faces Foreign Lawsuits in U.S., WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1999, at A12). 
 97. See Sherrill, supra note 93, at 506. 
 98. See id. at 512. 
 99. See Bianchini, supra note 17, at 712. 
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against it. 100 With all of this mounting pressure, for the first time in 
the history of tobacco litigation, the tobacco industry blinked. 
 The first break came on March 20, 1997, when Liggett & Myers 
broke rank with the rest of the tobacco industry and offered to settle 
with the states. 101 Because Liggett & Myers was one of the smallest 
tobacco companies and facing financial difficulty, it decided it could 
not afford to maintain the status quo by refusing to talk settlement 
and risking a massive judgment.102 Thus, for a comparatively slight 
financial pay out, some very damaging admissions, and the release of 
internal documents, Liggett & Myers “struck a deal with the states’ 
Attorneys General and ended the conspiracy of silence and fraud 
which had endured for over fifty years.”103 
 Shortly following the settlement with Liggett & Myers, the to-
bacco industry as a whole broke against its past traditions and en-
tered into negotiations with the all of the states’ Attorneys Gen-
eral.104 The tobacco industry decided to break from its prior history 
and enter these negotiations in an attempt to level the playing field 
by getting the states out of tobacco litigation and getting back to the 
days of litigating against individual plaintiffs with limited financ-
ing.105 
 Thus, on June 20, 1997, a deal was struck between the tobacco in-
dustry and the Attorneys General of forty states. 106 In exchange for 
the payment of $368.5 billion to the individual states, the states 
agreed to recommend a federal bill to Congress that limited tobacco 
industry liability to individual and class plaintiffs. 107 Finalization of 
the settlement then rested on action by Congress. 108 However, in 
June 1998, because of the numerous changes made to the proposed 
legislation by various legislators, by the time the bill reached the 
                                                                                                                  
 100. See id. 
 101. See Player, supra note 27, at 329. 
 102. See id. at 330. 
 103. Id. (citing Joseph Menn & Carrick Mollenkamp, Global Tobacco Pact Could Break 
Liggett, NEWS AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 27, 1997, at A5). 
 104. See Dietsch Field, supra note 6, at 125.  
 105. See Bianchini, supra note 17, at 712-13. 
 106. See id. at 705. 
 107. See Dagan & White, supra note 1, at 364. 
 108. See Bianchini, supra note 17, at 705. The passage of the proposed settlement by 
Congress would have vastly limited the liability of the tobacco industry. To start, the pro-
posed settlement would settle “all lawsuits filed by state or local governments, most pend-
ing class action lawsuits, and all individual suits based on claims of addiction or depend-
ency.” Id. at 708. Further, “[a]ll class action lawsuits, and other procedural aggregation de-
vices were to be banned . . . .” Id. This, of course, would force all future suits against the 
tobacco industry to be brought individually, tilting the playing field back in favor of the to-
bacco industry. To top the entire thing off, the settlement would ban all suits based on 
claims of addiction and dependency, would eliminate punitive damages, and cap the total 
amount that could be ordered paid to claimants in any single year. See id. at 709. “In short, 
the agreement would have stopped existing lawsuits and deterred future suits.” Id. 
802  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:787 
 
Senate floor, the tobacco industry had withdrawn its support for the 
bill and successfully lobbied for its defeat.109 
 While the proposed bill was winding its way through Congress, 
the tobacco industry and the individual states did not have time to 
wait and see if Congress would pass the proposed legislation as the 
state suits continued toward trial. Wanting to settle these cases prior 
to trial, the tobacco industry entered into negotiations with several 
states whose trials were quickly approaching. In July 1997, Missis-
sippi became the first state to settle with the tobacco industry for a 
total of $3.4 billion.110 Florida soon followed by settling for $11.3 bil-
lion.111 Florida was followed by Texas, who settled its suit for $14.5 
billion.112 Finally, Minnesota, which settled only after its trial had 
entered closing arguments, settled with the tobacco industry for $6.5 
billion and became the final state to settle individually with the to-
bacco industry.113 If the proposed global settlement were to be final-
ized by the appropriate congressional action, those individual settle-
ments would serve as those four states’ individual payments. When 
Congress failed to pass the required legislation, Mississippi, Florida, 
Texas, and Minnesota became the only states with hard deals in 
place. 
 The remaining forty-six states got their deal in November 1998.114 
Approved by the remaining forty-six states and the tobacco industry, 
the settlement provided for a total of $206 billion to be paid out by 
the tobacco industry in annual installments until 2025.115 Because 
this deal did not require comprehensive legislation to pass Congress, 
it became final once agreed upon by all parties.116 Thus, all fifty 
states were now settled with the tobacco industry. For under $300 
billion, the tobacco industry was able to reimburse all fifty states for 
Medicaid funds spent to treat injuries caused by tobacco products. To 
date, these state settlements have produced the only actual monetary 
recoveries from the tobacco industry untouchable on appeal. 
                                                                                                                  
 109. See Dagan & White, supra note 1, at 370. For example, the total amount of set-
tlement proceeds to be paid by the state was increased to $516 billion, and the protections 
from civil liability included in the original settlement were not included in the version of 
the bill that made it through committee. See id. at 369. 
 110. See id. at 370. 
 111. See id. 
 112. See id. at 370-71. 
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 114. See id. 
 115. See id. at 372. 
 116. The settlement also does not include many of the protections the tobacco industry 
had negotiated in the first global settlement proposal. See id. For instance, this settlement 
does not include a prohibition of class actions or punitive damages. See id. 
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2.   Class Actions 
 The second real threat to the tobacco industry in the third wave of 
tobacco litigation is the class action. The class action has enabled 
plaintiffs to better meet the tobacco industry’s various litigation 
strategies by allowing the plaintiffs to aggregate and share resources 
and information.117 The first class action was filed in federal district 
court in New Orleans, Louisiana, on March 29, 1994.118 
 The case of Castano v. American Tobacco Company119 was filed on 
behalf of all people addicted to nicotine in the United States. 120 The 
class potentially included over one hundred million people and was 
easily the largest class action ever filed.121 The case, which depended 
on theories of negligence, fraud, and deceit in its claim that the to-
bacco companies had concealed and suppressed material research 
that showed nicotine is highly addictive, would be taken on and fi-
nanced by sixty private law firms from across the country.122 The case 
was then certified as a class action in a controversial opinion by the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on 
February 17, 1995.123 
 The plaintiffs’ goal of resolving all of the nation’s tobacco addiction 
claims in one massive suit was quickly dissolved on interlocutory ap-
peal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 124 
Finding that the district court erred by “ignoring variations in state 
law and how a trial on the alleged causes of action would be tried,” 
                                                                                                                  
 117. See Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in the Ef-
fective Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 63, 64 (1997). 
 118. See id. at 72. Note that this was the first class action filed on behalf of smokers, 
however, an earlier class action was brought against the tobacco industry in 1991 on behalf 
of flight attendants who claimed harm from secondhand smoke. See infra Part.III.A and 
accompanying text.   
 119. 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995). 
 120. See Dietsch Field, supra note 6, at 115. 
 121. See Symposium, Theorizing about Trial Courts: Lawyers, Policymaking, and To-
bacco Litigation, 23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 897, 910 (1998). 
 122. See id. The case was initially in the hands of Wendall Gauthier, a private lawyer 
in New Orleans. See id. Mr. Gauthier then contacted the other 60 firms and convinced 
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 123. See Castano, 160 F.R.D. at 560-61. The court defined the class as: 
(a) All nicotine-dependent persons in the United States, its territories, and pos-
sessions and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, who have purchased and 
smoked cigarettes manufactured by the defendants [tobacco companies]; 
(b) the estates, representatives, and administrators of these nicotine-dependent 
cigarette smokers; and, 
(c) the spouses, children, relatives and “significant others” of these nicotine-
dependent cigarette smokers as their heirs or survivors. 
Id. There has already been much scholarly discussion of the Castano case. For a good over-
view of the court’s reasons for certifying the class action, see Robert T. Krebs, Note, Cas-
tano v. American Tobacco Co.: Class Treatment of Mass Torts is Going Up in Smoke, 24 N. 
KY. L. REV. 673 (1997). 
 124. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). 
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the Fifth Circuit explained that “the collective wisdom of individual 
juries is necessary before [this court] commits the fate of an entire 
industry or, indeed, the fate of a class of millions, to a single jury.”125 
Further, because of the novelty of the plaintiffs’ addiction-based 
claims, the Fifth Circuit concluded that it could not allow the district 
court to correct any of the perceived errors on remand but must, in-
stead, remand the case and instruct the district court to dismiss the 
complaint entirely.126 
 The attorneys involved in the Castano case, however, were not yet 
ready to give up the fight. After Castano was decertified, the sixty 
private law firms involved in the filing of Castano filed smaller class 
action suits, called “Sons of Castano,” in state and federal courts 
throughout the country.127 However, with Castano standing as prece-
dent, state and federal courts followed the lead of the Fifth Circuit 
and either refused to certify these class actions or decertified them on 
appeal.128 
 After the failure of Castano and the “Sons of Castano” to maintain 
certification, the class action was viewed as a nonthreat to the to-
bacco industry.129 It seemed that the plaintiffs had lost a great ad-
vantage and would no longer be able to level the playing field with 
the tobacco industry through mass class actions. Instead, it appeared 
plaintiffs would again be forced to bring suit individually.130 Yet, 
while all of the attention was being focused on Castano and its de-
scendants, the real class action threat to the tobacco industry was 
brewing in Florida. A Florida attorney, Stanley Rosenblatt, filed two 
separate class actions against the tobacco industry in Miami, Florida: 
Broin v. Phillip Morris Cos.131 and Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co.132 These two actions would go on to become not merely the first, 
and thus far, the only class actions to reach trial against the tobacco 
industry, but Engle would go on to become the only class action to re-
sult in a verdict for the plaintiffs. 
III.   BACKGROUND OF ENGLE V. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO CO. 
A.   Broin v. Phillip Morris Cos. 
 Originally filed in 1991, Broin v. Phillip Morris Cos. was a class 
action suit seeking to recover for injuries caused to a class of 60,000 
                                                                                                                  
 125. Id. at 751-52. 
 126. See id. at 752. 
 127. Kearns, supra note 17, at 1354. 
 128. See id. at 1354-55. 
 129. See Dagan & White, supra note 1, at 362. 
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flight attendants from the inhalation of secondhand smoke.133 The 
class members were nonsmokers throughout the United States who 
alleged they were injured by secondhand smoke from the cigarettes 
of airline passengers.134 Because Broin was brought on behalf of a 
class of nonsmokers, it was particularly dangerous to the tobacco in-
dustry because it effectively prevented tobacco lawyers from arguing 
the defense of assumption of risk.135 
 When the trial court refused to certify Broin as a proper class ac-
tion, it appeared that this case would suffer the same fate as Castano 
and its progeny; however, the Third District Court of Appeal re-
versed the trial court’s order refusing certification and ordered that 
the case be remanded for the certification of a class of all nonsmoking 
flight attendants alleging injury.136 The stage was then set for the 
first class action against the tobacco industry to proceed to trial be-
fore Judge Robert Kaye. 
 Surprisingly, four months into the trial, in May 1997, the tobacco 
industry once again backed down from its proud traditions and set-
tled with the Broin class for $349 million.137 Even though the indi-
vidual class members did not receive any of the settlement proceeds, 
the settlement reserved the right for each class member to bring suit 
individually against the tobacco industry to recover for his or her in-
juries. 138 
 While the Broin class action was historic for being the first class 
action to reach trial against the tobacco industry, plaintiffs had still 
failed to bring a successful class action suit against the tobacco in-
dustry for the majority of those injured by the industry’s products—
the smokers. However, Mr. Rosenblatt was not finished and followed 
the certification of Broin with the certification of a case of much 
greater proportion. 
B.   Certification of the Engle class 
 Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. was filed on May 5, 1994, and 
sought damages on behalf of all citizens of the United States injured 
                                                                                                                  
 133. 641 So. 2d at 889. 
 134. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 117, at 72. 
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by their addiction to cigarettes. 139 The primary assertion in the Engle 
complaint was that the tobacco industry intentionally manipulated 
the nicotine levels in their cigarettes and concealed all information 
about the addictive nature of the drug.140 To compensate the class for 
injuries caused by the addictive nature of nicotine and the conceal-
ment of this information, the complaint sought $200 billion in dam-
ages.141 Remarkably, Engle overcame the great hurdle of previous 
class actions filed on behalf of injured smokers when Circuit Judge 
Harold Solomon certified the nationwide class. 142 
 The decision to certify the class was immediately appealed by the 
tobacco industry. Despite the tobacco industry’s arguments concern-
ing the nonviability of class certification and the precedent set by 
Castano and its progeny, with only one major modification, the Third 
District Court of Appeal affirmed class certification.143 The Third Dis-
trict Court modified the order certifying a nationwide class by reduc-
ing it to “manageable proportions” and restricting the class to Florida 
citizens and residents. 144 The Third District Court advised, however, 
that “certain individual issues [would] have to be tried as to each 
class member, principally the issue of damages . . . .”145 Thus, the 
Third District Court, in its original opinion, concluded that while 
“the basic issues of liability common to all members of the class 
[would] clearly predominate over the individual issues” and thus al-
low for class certification, the issue of damages could not be decided 
as a class but must instead be tried individually after the determina-
tion of the basic issues of liability for the class. 146 
C.   Application of the Original Engle Trial Plan 
 Once the class was certified, a trial plan had to be devised that 
would enable the trial of a class action comprising possibly 500,000 
Floridians. The original trial judge, Judge Allen Postman, devised a 
                                                                                                                  
 139. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 117, at 73. 
 140. See id. 
 141. See Kearns, supra note 17, at 1356.  
 142. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). 
 143. See id. 
 144. Id. at 42. The court stated that it did not feel there was anything “inherently 
wrong about certifying a national class in a state court,” as it had done in Broin. Id. How-
ever, it felt that where “the class contains so many members from so many different states 
and territories that it threatens to overwhelm the resources of a state court, it is settled 
that such a broad-based class is totally unmanageable and cannot be certified.” Id. The 
class consists of “[a]ll Florida citizens and residents, and their survivors, who have suf-
fered, presently suffer or who have died from diseases and medical conditions caused by 
their addiction to cigarettes that contain nicotine.” Kelder & Daynard, supra note 117, at 
73. 
 145. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d at 41. 
 146. Id. 
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three-phase trial plan to accomplish this purpose.147 In Phase I, the 
plaintiffs would have to prove that the tobacco industry caused inju-
ries to the class by manipulating the nicotine level in its cigarettes 
and that the industry misled the public about the addictive nature of 
nicotine.148 The jury would also have to determine if the actions of the 
tobacco industry permitted punitive damages and, if so, how they 
would be calculated.149 In Phase II, the representative class members 
would have to prove actual damages, and the jury would assess the 
amount of compensatory damages required to compensate these rep-
resentative class members for their injuries. 150 Finally, Phase III of 
the trial would consist of individual trials for the other class mem-
bers to determine whether they were entitled to compensatory dam-
ages.151 However, after establishing the trial plan, Judge Postman 
was forced to withdraw from the case for health reasons and Judge 
Robert Kaye, the same judge who heard Broin, took over.152 The case 
was then ready to proceed to trial. 
 After three months of voir dire, a jury of six, with ten alternates, 
was selected, and Phase I of the trial began on October 19, 1998.153 
Nearly nine months later, the jury returned its verdict for Phase I on 
July 7, 1999.154 The jury found the following: 1) smoking cigarettes 
causes several types of disease and medical conditions; 2) cigarettes 
containing nicotine are addictive; 3) the tobacco industry’s products 
were defective and unreasonably dangerous; 4) the tobacco industry 
made false statements of material fact with the intention of mislead-
ing smokers; 5) the tobacco industry concealed material information 
concerning the health effects and addictive nature of smoking; 6) the 
tobacco companies entered into an agreement to misrepresent and 
conceal information on the health effects of smoking and its addictive 
nature; 7) the products sold by the tobacco industry were not rea-
sonably fit for the use intended and did not conform to representa-
                                                                                                                  
 147. See Milo Geyelin, Jury Selection Set to Begin Today in Class Action by Florida 
Smokers, WALL ST. J., July 6, 1998, at A19. 
 148. See id. 
 149. See id. Judge Postman’s plan was to have the jury set a ratio of compensatory 
damages to punitive damages in order to determine the amount of punitive damages to 
which each class member would be entitled following individual trials on damages. See 
Engle Defendant’s Pursue Efforts to Remove Judge at County, Appellate Levels, MEALEY’S 
LITIG. REP.: TOBACCO, Sept. 2, 1999, at 53 [hereinafter, Efforts to Remove Judge]. 
 150. See Geyelin, supra note 147. The representative class members would then be en-
titled to the appropriate amount of punitive damages as determined by the ratio set by the 
jury during Phase I.  
 151. See id. Again, punitive damages would be determined by the ratio set in Phase I. 
Of course, if the jury found that the tobacco industry was not liable in Phase I, the trial 
would never proceed to Phases II and III.  
 152. See id. 
 153. See Jenny Staletovich, $200 Million Suit Against Tobacco Opens Combatively, 
PALM BCH. POST, Oct. 20, 1998, at A1. 
 154. See Kearns, supra note 17, at 1357. 
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tions of fact made by the tobacco industry; 8) the tobacco industry 
failed to exercise the degree of care which a reasonable cigarette 
manufacturer would exercise; 9) the tobacco industry engaged in ex-
treme and outrageous conduct with the intent to inflict severe emo-
tional distress; and most importantly, 10) the egregious conduct of 
the tobacco industry permitted punitive damages.155 After the jury 
found that the tobacco industry’s actions rose to a level that permits 
punitive damages, the case was supposed to proceed to the determi-
nation of the ratio that would be used in figuring the amount of puni-
tive damages in each class member’s individual trial. Instead, Judge 
Kaye made the decision to amend the operating trial plan.156 
D.   The Amended Engle Trial Plan 
 Judge Kaye entered his supplemental trial plan and radically al-
tered the procedure by which punitive damages would be assessed. 
Instead of following the plan as set by Judge Postman and instruct-
ing the jury to set a ratio by which punitive damages would be en-
tered, Judge Kaye’s plan would instruct the jury to award punitive 
damages, if it found punitive damages were warranted, in one lump 
sum.157 The punitive damages issue would be tried as part of Phase II 
but would be bifurcated from the assessment of compensatory dam-
ages to the representative class members. 158 Thus, according to Judge 
Kaye’s trial plan, the issue of punitive damages would be completed 
at the close of Phase II and individual trials on punitive damages 
would be unnecessary.159 
 While Judge Kaye admitted that his amended trial plan was con-
trary to the plan devised by his predecessor, he felt that “there [were] 
far less legal issues and problems” with a plan to assess punitive 
damages in one lump sum than in a plan that determined punitive 
damages under a ratio because of the unique circumstances in 
Engle.160 Judge Kaye stated that the assessment of punitive damages 
in one lump sum was superior to the previous plan because “a puni-
tive defendant will know what its overall obligation is at the close of 
                                                                                                                  
 155. See Verdict Form for Phase I, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273 
(Fla. 11th. Cir. Ct. June 17, 1999) (on file with author). 
 156. See Efforts to Remove Judge, supra note 149, at 9.  
 157. See id. 
 158. See id. 
 159. See id.  
 160. Id. (quoting Judge Kaye). Recall that in Phase I of the original trial plan, the jury 
was to determine how punitive damages would be calculated if it found that punitive dam-
ages were warranted. See supra Part III.C. The jury w as to set a ratio of punitive damages 
to compensatory damages. Once compensatory damages were calculated for each individ-
ual class member in each individual trial, punitive damages would be set according to the 
ratio. Judge Kaye was uncomfortable with the ratio method as that would cause punitive 
damages to vary according to compensatory damages, even though the tobacco industry’s 
behavior “was the same [toward] each class member.” Id. 
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phase two; and the plaintiff class will also know what the total lump 
sum punitive damage award is that will be divided by the remaining 
qualified class members.”161 Recognizing that there were numerous 
legal issues involved in his amended trial plan, Judge Kaye reasoned 
that it was of greater benefit for the tobacco industry to know the ex-
act amount of punitive damages rather than risk the imposition of an 
unknown punitive damages award of potentially enormous propor-
tions. 162 Predictably, the tobacco industry disagreed with Judge 
Kaye’s assessment of what was in its best interest and appealed his 
trial plan to the Third District Court of Appeal prior to the start of 
Phase II.163 
 The tobacco industry argued that this trial plan violated the gen-
eral rule that damages are inherently an individual issue and cannot 
be determined for an entire class, but must instead be tried sepa-
rately.164 The industry also argued that it was impossible to assess 
punitive damages in a lump sum prior to the assessment of compen-
satory damages for each individual class member as constitutional 
requirements demand that punitive damages bear a reasonable rela-
tionship to actual damages. 165 Initially agreeing with the tobacco in-
dustry, the Third District Court quashed Judge Kaye’s supplemental 
trial plan “permitting an aggregate trial on the amount of punitive 
damages prior to a determination of liability and compensatory dam-
ages.”166 However, the plaintiffs asked the court to reconsider its rul-
ing and on September 17, 1999, the Third District Court vacated its 
previous order and set the issue for oral argument.167 
 The tobacco industry argued that the Third District Court should 
enforce its mandate of January 31, 1996, in which it stated that the 
issue of damages would have to be tried separately.168 Surprisingly, 
                                                                                                                  
 161. Id. (quoting Judge Kaye).  
 162. See id. 
 163. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2061 (Fla. 3d DCA 
Sept. 3, 1999).   
 164. See Disqualification Denied, Appeal Filed in Engle; Punitives Class-Wide; Co-Lead 
Plaintiff Dies, MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: TOBACCO, Aug. 19, 1999, at 8. 
 165. See id. In an amicus brief, Associated Industries of Florida worried that assess-
ment of one lump sum punitive damage award “will remain the same even if the defen-
dants prevailed in virtually all of the subsequent phase three trials of individual compe n-
satory damages.” Efforts to Remove Judge, supra note 149, at 9 (quoting amicus brief). 
 166. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2061 (Fla. 3d DCA Sept. 
3, 1999). Not surprisingly, this opinion was in agreement with the Third District Court’s 
statement in its first Engle opinion when it stated that the issue of damages must be tried 
individually. 
 167. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2193 (Fla. 3d DCA 
Sept. 17, 1999). 
 168. See Engle Court Wants Response to Constitutional Challenge of Lump Sum Puni-
tives, MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: TOBACCO, Nov. 4, 1999, at 13 [hereinafter Challenge of Lump 
Sum Punitives]. The tobacco industry was referring to the Third District Court opinion af-
firming certification of the class, in which it said that the issue of damages would have to 
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the Third District Court decided not to enforce its previous statement 
and denied the industry’s motion to enforce mandate.169 However, the 
court denied the tobacco industry’s motion without prejudice to the 
industry’s “right to raise the underlying issues . . . on any appropri-
ate subsequent appeal.”170 Thus, in a time period of just over one 
month, the Third District Court went from ordering the trial court to 
vacate its trial plan to refusing to order the trial court to comply with 
the Third District Court’s own opinion on the trial of punitive dam-
ages. 
 The tobacco industry then took its arguments to the Florida Su-
preme Court and requested a “Petition for Writ of Prohibition and 
Mandamus or in the Alternative, Request for an Extraordinary Writ 
Under the All Writs Power.”171 The Supreme Court refused to grant 
the requested writ, but, like the Third District Court, ruled without 
prejudice to raise the underlying issues as appropriate in any subse-
quent direct appeal to the district court. 172 While waiting on the 
court’s ruling, Phase II, involving the assessment of compensatory 
damages for the three representative class members, began on No-
vember 1, 1999.173 
 On April 7, 2000, following the Phase II trial, Engle again made 
history when it became the first class action to assess actual dam-
ages against the tobacco industry. The jury found that smoking was 
the legal cause of the three representative class members’ illnesses. 174 
The jury went on to assess $2,850,000 in compensatory damages to 
representative class member Mary Farnan; $5,831,000 in compensa-
tory damages to Frank Amodeo; and a total of $4,023,000 in compen-
satory damages for the Della Vecchia family.175 With the first part of 
Phase II and the appeals on the issue of the assessment of punitive 
damages completed, the trial court was ready to proceed to the con-
troversial assessment of punitive damages for the entire class. 
                                                                                                                  
be tried separately. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39, 41 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1996). 
 169. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2392 (Fla. 3d DCA 
Oct. 20, 1999). 
 170. Id. 
 171. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 751 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1999). 
 172. See id. 
 173. See Challenge of Lump Sum Punitives, supra note 168. 
 174. See Verdict Form for Phase II, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273 
(Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Apr. 7, 2000) (on file with author). 
 175. See id. The Della Vecchia family included the Estate of Angie Della Vecchia; 
Ralph Della Vecchia, the husband of Angie Della Vecchia who recovered for loss of compan-
ionship, loss of protection, and mental pain and suffering; and James Della Vecchia, the 
son of Angie Della Vecchia, who recovered for loss of parental companionship, instruction, 
guidance, and mental pain and suffering. See id. It has not yet been determined if this 
judgment will withstand the tobacco industry appeal. 
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 The trial on the assessment of punitive damages began on May 
22, 2000, and proceeded for two months.176 After hearing from a mul-
titude of witnesses, the case was given to the jury to decide how 
much the tobacco industry had to pay in punitive damages. After de-
liberating for less than five hours, the jury returned its verdict and 
ordered the tobacco industry to pay $144.8 billion.177 While this ver-
dict was below the $200 billion requested by the plaintiffs, it was still 
a stunning victory. However, there is great concern that the award of 
punitive damages in Engle may be an exercise in futility that will be 
overturned on appeal as the Engle trial plan appears to be contrary 
to both federal constitutional and Florida law. 
 The trial plan allowed the jury to award punitive damages to all of 
the class members without a finding of liability to individual plain-
tiffs for their alleged injuries. 178 The only finding of liability prior to 
the award of punitive damages was a finding of general liability to 
the class. Thus, if the award of punitive damages survives appeal, 
each individual class member that proves he or she was injured will 
be entitled to an equal portion of the punitive damages award. As-
suming that each of the estimated 500,000 class members is able to 
prove injury, each will be entitled to $290,000 in punitive damages. 
Each qualified class member will be entitled to the same amount of 
punitive damages no matter the amount of compensatory damages 
awarded. In other words, the amount of punitive damages awarded 
to any individual class member will bear no relationship to the 
amount of actual damages awarded. Instead, the amount of punitive 
damages each class member recovers will only be dependent on the 
number of class members that obtain a finding of liability in their in-
dividual trials, as the lump sum punitive damages award is to be di-
vided equally amongst the class. 
 The possibility of such an award not only raised the concern of the 
tobacco companies, the State of Florida and the Attorney General of 
the State of Florida also became concerned. The Florida Legislature 
responded by creating a new Florida law that would assist the to-
bacco industry by staying the execution of a large punitive damages 
award during the process of any appeal.179 The Attorney General, 
                                                                                                                  
 176. See Tobacco Industry Wins a Round in Court, MIAMI BUS. DAILY REV., May 23, 
2000, at A3.   
 177. See Levin, supra note 3. 
 178. See supra Part III.C.  
 179. See Act effective May 9, 2000, ch. 00-128, § 4, 2000 Fla. Laws (to be codified at 
FLA. STAT. § 768.733). The Act created a new law that changed the amount of the bond, re-
quired in a certified class action, to stay the execution of judgment entered for punitive 
damages while the award was on appeal. See id. Under the new law, the bond required to 
stay execution of judgment is capped at $100 million. See id. Prior to this new law, the to-
bacco industry would have had to post a bond in the amount of the entire award, $144.8 
billion, plus “twice the statutory rate of interest” on the total judgment. FLA. R. APP. P. 
9.310. The statutory rate of interest is set by the Comptroller of the State of Florida each 
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Robert Butterworth, went even further than trying to protect the to-
bacco industry’s ability to appeal and joined with the tobacco compa-
nies in claiming that the trial plan was contrary to the law of Florida 
and to the tobacco industry’s due process rights under the U.S. Con-
stitution.180 Attorney General Butterworth went so far as to propose 
legislation that would prevent the type of trial plan that was put in 
place in Engle.181  
 Certainly the Attorney General is incorrect, and the trial court did 
not decide on a trial plan that will be overturned on appeal. Yet, al-
though the Supreme Court of Florida and the Third District Court of 
Appeal refused to order the trial court to vacate its current trial plan, 
neither court expressly approved the current plan. The courts simply 
denied the tobacco industry’s request to enforce the statement of the 
Third District Court that damages would have to be tried individu-
ally. Thus, the issue of the assessment of damages will be before 
these two courts again, and quite possibly, could end up in front of 
the U.S. Supreme Court on a constitutional challenge. The question 
then becomes, based upon federal constitutional and Florida law, 
what is the likely outcome of the pending appeal of this enormous 
punitive damages award? 
                                                                                                                  
year and was set at 10% per annum in 2000. See FLA. STAT. § 55.03 (2000). Thus, in order 
to stay execution of judgment pending appeal, the tobacco industry would have had to post 
a bond in the amount of $144.8 billion plus 20% interest. Note that the statutory rate of in-
terest has been set at 10% since 1995, however, the Comptroller raised it to 11% for 2001. 
See Statutory Interest Rates Pursuant to s. 55.03, Florida Statutes, http://www.dbf.state. 
fl.us/interest.html (last visited May 1, 2001).  
 180. See 00-21 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 1 (2000) (finding that “an award of compensatory 
damages is a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages where an actual damage is an 
essential element of the underlying tort”); U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1.  
 181. See id. The opinion of Attorney General Butterworth was provided upon the re-
quest of Toni Jennings, President, The Florida Senate, and John E. Thrasher, President, 
The Florida House of Representatives. See id. Attorney General Butterworth recommended 
that the Florida Legislature enact a new law in the event that the legislature found it nec-
essary “to codify the common law regarding the imposition of compensatory and punitive 
damages.” Id. The proposed legislation would create Section 768.726, Florida Statutes, and 
read as follows: 
(1) No punitive damages may be awarded in any civil action, including a class 
action, unless the compensatory damages stage of the trial has been completed 
as to all plaintiffs covered thereby or in the action, whether named parties or 
represented class members, prior to the determination of punitive damages, ex-
cept in cases where actual damages are not an element of the underlying cause 
of action. Any punitive damage determination rendered or judgment entered 
contrary to the provisions of this subsection is null and void. 
(2) This section shall apply to all cases and causes of action, regardless of the 
date of filing, pending on or after the effective date of this act. 
Id. at 12-13. The proposed legislation was not passed during the 2000 session of the Flor-
ida Legislature. 
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IV.   THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND FLORIDA STANDARDS FOR 
THE ASSESSMENT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
A.   The Federal Constitutional Standard for the Assessment of 
Punitive Damages 
 Punitive damages are designed to accomplish two purposes: pun-
ishment and deterrence.182 Recently, in light of a concern over the 
perceived rapid expansion in the amount of punitive damages 
awards, a new area of constitutional law has developed concerning 
the assessment of punitive damages. 183 This new area of constitu-
tional law is particularly concerned with limitations that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment places on the proce-
dure of assessing punitive damages and their amount.184 
 The fundamental purpose of the Due Process Clause is to guaran-
tee fairness in the legal system. 185 The idea that the assessment of 
punitive damages must comply with due process originated in a con-
curring opinion authored by Justice O’Connor in 1988.186 In this opin-
ion, Justice O’Connor wrote that the exercise by juries of “wholly 
standardless discretion” in establishing punishments appears to vio-
late the strictures of due process.187 Shortly after this opinion was is-
sued, defendants began to challenge punitive damages on both pro-
cedural and substantive due process violations. 188 As these challenges 
became more prevalent, it became clear the Supreme Court would 
soon be forced to define the boundaries of this alleged due process 
right. 
                                                                                                                  
 182. See James R. McKown, Punitive Damages: State Trends and Developments, 14 
REV. LITIG. 419, 422 (1995). 
 183. See Douglas G. Harkin, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore: A Trial Judge’s 
Guide to Jury Instructions and Judicial Review of Punitive Damage Awards, 60 MONT. L. 
REV. 367, 368 (1999). 
 184. See Stephanie L. Nagel, BMW v. Gore : The United States Supreme Court Over-
turns an Award of Punitive Damages as Violative of the Due Process Clause of the Constitu-
tion, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1025, 1028 (1997). Attempts to create a new branch of constitutional 
law on the issue of punitive damages as it concerns the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive 
Fines Clause was snuffed out by the Supreme Court in Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. v. 
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989). In Browning-Ferris, the Court ruled that the 
Eighth Amendment prohibition on excessive fines is not applicable to civil suits between 
private parties. See id. at 264. 
 185. See Nagel, supra note 184, at 1028.  
 186. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 88 (1988) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part). 
 187. Id. 
 188. The arguments in these two types of challenges were quite different. In a proce-
dural due process challenge, the defendant would typically challenge either the instruc-
tions given to the jury or the process of reviewing the award of punitive damages. See Na-
gel, supra note 184, at 1028. In a substantive due process challenge, the defendant would 
challenge the amount of the punitive damages award as excessive, arguing that it thus 
constituted a taking of property without due process of law. See id. 
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 The definition of due process rights involved in the assessment of 
punitive damages began in 1991 when the Court issued its first ma-
jority opinion on the issue in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. 
Haslip.189 In Haslip, the defendant appealed an award of punitive 
damages that was more than four times the amount of compensatory 
damages.190 In particular, the defendant challenged the process of 
awarding punitive damages in Alabama, the forum state, as violative 
of its procedural due process rights by claiming the award was “the 
product of unbridled jury discretion.”191 Wanting to resolve the “long-
enduring debate” on the assessment of punitive damages, the Court 
granted certiorari to review both the process of assessing punitive 
damages and the constitutionality of the amount of punitive damages 
award.192  
 The Court began by reviewing the common law method of assess-
ing punitive damages. Under the common law method, the jury was 
instructed on the “need to deter similar wrongful conduct” prior to 
deciding on an amount of punitive damages.193 If the jury chose to en-
ter an award of punitive damages, the award was then reviewed by 
the “trial and appellate courts to ensure that it [was] reasonable.”194 
After reviewing the common law method, the Court reasoned that 
this method was sufficient to protect the defendant’s procedural due 
process rights because “[p]unitive damages have long been a part of 
traditional state tort law,” and the common law method is not “so in-
herently unfair as to deny due process and be per se unconstitu-
tional.”195 However, the Court warned that just “because punitive 
damages [had] been recognized for so long” did not mean that they 
were always constitutional.196 
 The greatest concern of the Court in Haslip, however, was not the 
common law method of assessing punitive damages but, instead, the 
limitation of jury discretion, as it felt that unlimited jury discretion 
could lead to “extreme results that jar one’s constitutional sensibili-
ties.”197 As such, the Court wanted to establish a postverdict review 
standard for a reviewing court to determine whether a jury’s award 
was reasonable. In setting this standard, the Court refused to “draw 
a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable 
and the constitutionally unacceptable,” and instead, simply stated 
that “general concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance 
                                                                                                                  
 189. 499 U.S. 1 (1991). 
 190. See id. at 23. 
 191. Id. at 7. 
 192. Id. at 7-8. 
 193. Id. at 15. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 15, 17. 
 196. Id. at 18. 
 197. Id. 
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from the court . . . properly enter into the constitutional calculus.”198 
Based on this vague standard of reasonableness and guidance, the 
Court set out to determine whether the process of awarding punitive 
damages in Alabama provided the defendant with sufficient protec-
tion against unbridled jury discretion. 
 Specifically, the Court analyzed the instructions given to the jury 
and the process of review by the trial and appellate courts. Beginning 
with the jury instructions, the Court found that the instructions 
given to the jury on awarding punitive damages cannot give the jury 
unlimited discretion.199 To limit the jury’s discretion, the Court ap-
proved the instructions used by the trial court in Haslip which in-
structed the jury “not to compensate the plaintiff for any injury” and 
confined the award of punitive damages to “deterrence and retribu-
tion,” and further instructed the jury to “take into consideration the 
character and degree of the wrong.”200 Because of these three limita-
tions on the jury’s discretion, the Haslip jury instructions sufficiently 
protected the defendant’s procedural due process rights because they 
“reasonably accommodated [the defendant’s] interest in rational de-
cisionmaking and [the state’s] interest in meaningful individualized 
assessment of appropriate deterrence and retribution.”201 
 As far as the review process was concerned, the Court ruled that 
the postverdict review process in Alabama was adequate because it 
“[made] certain that the punitive damages [were] reasonable in their 
amount and rational in light of their purpose to punish what has oc-
curred and to deter its repetition.”202 The Court noted that the Ala-
bama Supreme Court had previously set forth specific standards 
which assured that the punitive damages were in proportion to the 
severity of the offense.203 With these procedural protections in place, 
the Court found that the defendant in Haslip had received all of the 
                                                                                                                  
 198. Id. 
 199. See id. at 19-20. 
 200. Id. at 19. 
 201. Id. at 20. 
 202. Id. at 21. 
 203. See id. at 22. The standards set forth for the appellate court to consider on review 
were: 
(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages 
award and the harm likely to result from the defendant’s conduct as well as the 
harm that actually has occurred; (b) the degree of reprehensibility of the defen-
dant’s conduct, the duration of that conduct, the defendant’s awareness, any 
concealment, and the existence and frequency of similar past conduct; (c) the 
profitability to the defendant of the wrongful conduct and the desirability of 
removing that profit and of having the defendant also sustain a loss; (d) the ‘fi-
nancial position’ of the defendant; (e) all the costs of litigation; (f) the imposi-
tion of criminal sanctions on the defendant for its conduct, these to be taken in 
mitigation; and (g) the existence of other civil awards against the defendant for 
the same conduct, these also to be taken in mitigation. 
Id. at 21-22. 
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due process protections to which it was entitled and affirmed the 
award of punitive damages.204 
 Thus, after Haslip, defendants had a clear procedural due process 
right to ensure that fact-finders did not have unlimited discretion in 
their assessment of punitive damages. To limit discretion, reasonable 
constraints had to be placed on a jury’s discretion, using both the 
jury instructions and the postverdict review process. With these limi-
tations in place, the Court was satisfied that reviewing courts could 
sufficiently determine “whether a particular award [was] greater 
than reasonably necessary to punish and deter.”205 
 While the Haslip opinion dealt mainly with the procedural due 
process rights involved in the assessment of punitive damages, the 
Court also made a statement on the substantive limit of punitive 
damages. The Court noted that a punitive damages award greater 
than four times the compensatory damages award “may be close to 
the line” of impropriety.206 This comment led many to believe that the 
Court would limit the amount of punitive damages to an amount of 
four to five times the amount of actual damages.207 However, the 
Court’s next case on this issue, TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Re-
sources Corp.,208 proved this belief to be incorrect. 
 In TXO, the Court was again faced with the issue of the due proc-
ess rights involved in the assessment of punitive damages. While at 
the conclusion of TXO the Court would maintain the Haslip standard 
on limiting the discretion of the jury, the Court added to the Haslip 
standard regarding the postverdict review of a punitive damages 
award.209 TXO involved an award of punitive damages that was 526 
times the amount of compensatory damages.210 The defendant, TXO 
Production Corporation (TXO), argued that a punitive damage award 
of this magnitude “[was] so excessive that it must be deemed an arbi-
trary deprivation of property without due process of law.”211 In light 
of Haslip, in which the Court stated that a punitive damages award 
four times the amount of compensatory damages was close to being 
constitutionally improper, TXO argued that a punitive damages 
award of 526 times compensatory damages was improper.212 How-
ever, following its statement in Haslip that a bright line mathemati-
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cal rule could not be established, the Court refused to overturn the 
award of punitive damages.213 
 The Court began its review of the punitive damages award by 
again placing primary importance on a defendant’s procedural due 
process rights in the assessment of punitive damages. 214 The Court 
went so far as to state that “[a]ssuming that fair procedures were fol-
lowed, a judgment that is a product of that process is entitled to a 
strong presumption of validity.”215 The Court further noted that there 
are “persuasive reasons for suggesting that the presumption should 
be irrebuttable.”216 Thus, great credence was to be given to the ver-
dict of the jury, and so long as fair procedures were followed, the 
Court felt that reviewing courts should rarely overturn an award of 
punitive damages. 
 In response to the defendant’s argument that a punitive damages 
award of 526 times the amount of compensatory damages must be 
excessive, the Court found that the ratio of compensatory to punitive 
damages was not the controlling factor in determining whether an 
award was excessive.217 While the Court felt that punitive damages 
must bear some relation to compensatory damages, it found that this 
comparison was just one of many factors to consider when determin-
ing an award’s reasonableness.218 Instead, the Court reasoned it was 
more appropriate to look at both the conduct of the defendant and 
the “disparity between the punitive award and the potential harm” in 
order to determine if a punitive award was excessive.219 In light of 
the malicious conduct and bad faith of the defendant in TXO and the 
potential harm to the plaintiffs, the Court approved an award of 526 
times compensatory damages as not being “so ‘grossly excessive’ as to 
be beyond the power of the State to allow.”220 
 Thus, following TXO, the due process rights involved in the as-
sessment of punitive damages became clearer. The reviewing court 
must first determine if the process of assessing punitive damages vio-
lated the defendant’s due process rights. 221 If the court determined 
that the procedures were fair, it must then look at the award itself to 
determine whether the award is grossly excessive and therefore un-
constitutional. 222 In determining whether the award is excessive, the 
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reviewing court should look not only at a comparison between the 
amount of punitive damages and the amount of compensatory dam-
ages, but also at the actions of the defendant and the potential harm 
that could result from the defendant’s conduct. 223 However, the Court 
made it very clear that so long as proper procedures were followed, 
the verdict of the jury was to be given great respect. 224 
 The Court then shifted away from giving great credence to the 
verdict of the jury in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.225 To start, 
the process of assessing punitive damages was not at issue in BMW, 
as both sides conceded that the process used met the standard estab-
lished in Haslip.226 The sole issue before the Court was whether a 
punitive damage award of $2 million, in light of a compensatory 
award in the amount of $4000, violated substantive due process as 
grossly excessive.227 
 The Court started by stating the general rule that “[o]nly when an 
award can fairly be categorized as ‘grossly excessive’ in relation to 
[the state’s interest in punishing reprehensible conduct] does it enter 
the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”228 To determine whether a punitive dam-
age award crosses into “the zone of arbitrariness,” the Court ex-
plained that the following three guideposts should be considered: 1) 
the reprehensibility of the actions of the defendant; 2) the difference 
between the actual harm or potential harm and the amount of puni-
tive damages; and 3) the amount of governmental penalties or sanc-
tions authorized for similar conduct as compared to the amount of 
punitive damages.229 
 Starting with the first guidepost, the Court found that the degree 
of reprehensibility of the defendant’s actions was perhaps “the most 
important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages 
award” as the award “should reflect ‘the enormity of [the] offense.’”230 
To assist other courts in determining the enormity of the offense, the 
Court set out a range for reprehensible acts. For instance, the Court 
stated that nonviolent crimes are less reprehensible than violent 
crimes; deceit is worse than pure negligence; and pure economic 
harm is less reprehensible than conduct that is a danger to human 
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health and safety.231 Through this loose assortment, the Court sup-
plied reviewing courts with a general idea of the degrees of reprehen-
sibility. The Court also took particular notice of aggravating factors 
like, “deliberate false statements, acts of affirmative misconduct, or 
concealment of evidence of improper motive,” that would support a 
large punitive damage award.232 After determining that the actions of 
the defendant in BMW were not of a high degree of reprehensibility, 
the Court moved to a discussion of the second guidepost. 233 
 According to the Court, the “most commonly cited indicium of an 
unreasonable or excessive punitive damages award is its ratio to the 
actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff.”234 While this test essentially 
compares the amount of compensatory damages awarded to the 
amount of punitive damages awarded, the test is not as easy as a 
simple comparison. Restating TXO, the Court explained that the 
“harm likely to result from the defendant’s conduct” must also be 
considered when comparing actual harm to the punitive damages 
award.235 While the Court continued its refusal to draw a “mathe-
matical bright line . . . that would fit every case,” the Court found 
that a punitive damage award of 500 times compensatory damages 
was excessive as the defendant’s conduct in BMW was not suffi-
ciently reprehensible.236 
 The Court then established the third guidepost for determining 
whether an award of punitive damages is excessive: government 
sanctions for comparable misconduct.237 This guidepost considers the 
criminal and civil penalties that are available to punish similar con-
duct.238 Believing it appropriate to give “’substantial deference’ to leg-
islative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions,” the Court 
compared an award of punitive damages to other potential sanc-
tions. 239 If the punitive damage award were significantly larger than 
an available civil penalty, there would be good reason to find the 
award excessive as the legislature had not deemed the particular 
conduct to be extremely reprehensible. 
 BMW is the most recent statement by the Supreme Court on the 
due process rights involved in the assessment of punitive damages. 
While the BMW test is certainly not the easiest to apply, the Court 
has at least given reviewing courts a standard to follow. A court re-
viewing an award of punitive damages is required to first determine 
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the reprehensibility of a defendant’s actions.240 Based on the existing 
degree of reprehensibility, the court should then proceed to compare 
the amount of punitive damages to the potential harm caused to the 
plaintiff.241 Obviously, as a defendant moves up the scale of repre-
hensibility, the defendant becomes eligible for a higher ratio of puni-
tive damages to compensatory damages. The Court should then com-
pare the award to applicable civil or criminal sanctions. 242 Giving 
great deference to the judgment of the legislature, if the punitive 
damage award greatly exceeds the punishment provided by the legis-
lature, the reviewing court should reduce the award to a satisfactory 
level.243 
 It is also clear that the Supreme Court no longer requires a re-
viewing court to give great deference to the judgment of the jury. For 
whatever reason, the jury in BMW felt that the defendant needed to 
be assessed a large amount of punitive damages in order to be prop-
erly punished. However, while it was conceded that the process of as-
sessing punitive damages was fair, the Court, who did not hear all of 
the evidence presented to the jury, proceeded to reverse the jury’s 
award of punitive damages.244 
B.   Florida Law on the Assessment of Punitive Damages 
 While the Supreme Court has placed primary importance on the 
reprehensibility of a defendant’s actions in determining whether an 
award of punitive damages is excessive, the Florida Legislature has 
taken a different approach. A new Florida law provides an exact for-
mula based upon the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory 
damages for determining whether a punitive damages award is ex-
cessive.245 Under this new law, punitive damages are limited to either 
three times the amount of compensatory damages awarded to each 
claimant or $500,000, whichever is greater.246 Thus, Florida courts 
have been ordered by the Florida Legislature to look solely at the ra-
tio of compensatory damages to punitive damages, rather than tak-
ing into consideration the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, 
to determine whether an award is excessive. The only exception to 
the ratio imposed by the Florida Legislature is that punitive dam-
ages can be assessed at four times compensatory damages if the ac-
tions of the defendant were “motivated solely by unreasonable finan-
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cial gain.”247 However, this new law is not applicable to Engle, as it 
did not take effect until October 1, 1999, well after the Engle trial 
plan was entered and the trial began.248 
 The statutory law applicable to Engle allows the courts to look at 
more than just the ratio of compensatory damages to punitive dam-
ages. While the statute in effect during Engle also includes a ratio of 
three times compensatory damages, punitive damages in excess of 
this ratio are only presumed to be excessive.249 The presumption can 
be overcome if the “claimant demonstrates to the court by clear and 
convincing evidence that the award is not excessive in light of the 
facts and circumstances which were presented to the trier of fact.”250 
Thus, the courts can affirm an award of punitive damages that is 
more than three times compensatory damages if the actions of the 
defendant are sufficiently reprehensible to overcome the presump-
tion of excessiveness. However, the Florida Legislature specifically 
excluded class actions from this statutory presumption.251 Since the 
Florida Legislature decided not to limit the amount of punitive dam-
ages by statute to class actions, any protections against the improper 
assessment of punitive damages in class actions must be derived 
from case law. 
 Florida case law provides two protections against an excessive 
amount of punitive damages: 1) the award must be related to the de-
fendant’s ability to pay, and 2) the award must have some relation to 
the reprehensibility of the defendant’s actions. 252 In contrast to statu-
tory law, Florida case law provides that punitive damages do not 
have to bear a reasonable relationship to compensatory damages. 253 
The Florida Supreme Court reasoned that requiring such a relation-
ship would lead to “an inflexible rule of law that translates into the 
application of [a] strict mathematical formula.”254 The court was also 
concerned about the evolution of a strict mathematical rule that 
would allow an affluent defendant who committed an egregious act, 
but only caused minimal injury, to escape being properly punished.255 
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In response to this concern, Florida courts have developed a line of 
case law that allows for punitive damages even if no compensatory 
damages are awarded. This line of case law culminated in the case of 
Ault v. Lohr,256 where the Florida Supreme Court was faced with the 
following question: “[M]ust a compensatory damages award underlie 
a punitive damages award in a case in which the jury has made ex-
press findings against a defendant?”257 
 In Ault, the plaintiffs were escaped inmates who, when recap-
tured, were handcuffed, and a police dog was then ordered to “bite 
and scratch them.”258 The plaintiffs sued for assault and battery, and 
the jury awarded one of them $0 in compensatory damages and 
$5000 in punitive damages.259 Because of conflicting interpretations 
by several Florida district courts, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit, which was trying Ault, asked the Florida 
Supreme Court to clarify a prior opinion. 260 In McLain v. Pensacola 
Coach Corp.,261 the supreme court had stated that “exemplary or pu-
nitive damages are not recoverable in an action of tort unless actual 
damages are shown.”262 To clarify McLain, the court held in Ault that 
a “finding of liability alone will support an award of punitive dam-
ages ‘even in the absence of financial loss for which compensatory 
damages would be appropriate.’”263 
 The Florida Supreme Court actually preferred a method of assess-
ing punitive damages based largely on the defendant’s ability to 
pay.264 However, the court felt that the ability to pay could not be the 
only factor in determining the amount of punitive damages because 
affluent defendants could not be charged with a higher award of pu-
nitive damages simply because of their increased ability to pay. Fur-
ther, under this method, an award could not be so large as to bank-
rupt the defendant.265 While a punitive damage award “should be 
painful enough to provide some retribution and deterrence,” an 
award which “bears no relation to the defendant’s ability to pay . . . 
and results in economic castigation” may be found excessive.266 
 The court determined that it was “not an accurate rule of law that 
the greater a defendant’s wealth, the greater must be [the amount of] 
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punitive damages.”267 Instead, the court determined that the net 
worth of the defendant was only one factor to be considered in assess-
ing punitive damages; the reprehensibility of the defendant’s actions 
must also be considered when determining whether an award is ex-
cessive.268 Looking at the size of the award and the actions of the de-
fendant, the court can then review an award and overturn it if the 
award is a shock to the judicial conscience.269 
 Beyond the above postverdict protections on the amount of puni-
tive damages, the Florida Supreme Court provided one additional 
protection to defendants in the process of assessing punitive dam-
ages. In the case of W.R. Grace & Co. v. Waters,270 the court changed 
the process of assessing punitive damages in Florida. All trial courts 
in Florida were ordered to bifurcate trials involving punitive dam-
ages when requested by a timely motion.271 Under this new process, 
the jury is supposed to determine liability, actual damages, and 
whether punitive damages are permitted in the first phase of the 
trial. 272 If the jury finds that punitive damages are indeed permitted, 
the case proceeds to the second phase where the jury determines 
whether punitive damages are necessary and in what amount.273 
Such a system protects defendants by “promot[ing] just punishment 
and deterrence while avoiding prejudice and bias.”274 This system 
prevents prejudice and bias by allowing defendants to present cer-
tain mitigating evidence in the punitive damages phase of the trial, 
such as prior punitive damages arising out of the same course of con-
duct, that, if admitted prior to a finding of liability, could cause bias 
amongst the jury.275 
 To summarize, Florida case law provides that punitive damages 
do not have to be reasonably related to compensatory damages. In 
fact, so long as the jury finds the defendant liable, it can award puni-
tive damages even if it declines to award compensatory damages. In-
stead, the jury is to assess punitive damages based upon the defen-
dant’s ability to pay and the reprehensibility of the defendant’s ac-
tions. If the defendant is found liable, courts are allowed to intervene 
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or reverse an award of punitive damages only if the award will either 
bankrupt the defendant or is so high that it shocks the judicial con-
science. 
V.   APPLICATION OF FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND FLORIDA LAW TO 
THE ENGLE TRIAL PLAN 
 Due to the protections and limitations provided by Florida case 
law and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, an 
appeal of the Engle jury’s landmark award of punitive damages 
should result in a reversal. While there will be many issues involved 
in any such appeal, such as the certification of Engle as a class ac-
tion, the method of assessing punitive damages presents one of the 
best reasons for the appellate courts to reverse this award. Quite 
simply, the assessment of punitive damages to an entire class of in-
jured Florida smokers prior to any findings of individual liability and 
individual harm for each class member violates both Florida law and 
the due process rights of the tobacco industry. While the Engle court 
was clearly concerned about congesting the Florida court system by 
holding hundreds of thousands of individual trials on the issue of 
damages, due process cannot be sacrificed for the sake of judicial 
economy.  
 As previously discussed in depth, the Engle trial court divided the 
trial into three separate phases. In Phase I, the jury found the to-
bacco industry liable for damages caused to the Engle class, due to 
the manipulation of nicotine levels and the concealment of relevant 
facts in order to cause the users of its product to become addicted. 276 
The jury also found that the tobacco industry’s actions were so egre-
gious that punitive damages were permitted.277 The trial then pro-
ceeded to Phase II. Phase II was bifurcated, and in the first part of 
the phase, the jury found that the tobacco industry was liable for the 
injuries caused to three representative class members and assessed 
compensatory damages. 278 The trial then proceeded to the second 
part of Phase II and the assessment of punitive damages in one lump 
sum, for the benefit of the entire class. 279 It is this second part of 
Phase II that falls short of the legal requirements for the assessment 
of punitive damages. 
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 The first concern is clearly that the amount of this award may vio-
late Florida law by bankrupting the tobacco industry.280 Prior to a 
change in Florida law, the Engle trial plan may have bankrupted the 
tobacco industry before completing the appellate process, as Florida 
law would have required the industry to post a bond in the amount of 
the judgment, $144.8 billion, “plus twice the statutory rate of interest 
on [the judgment],” in order to obtain a stay of execution of the 
award.281 As the tobacco industry would likely not have been able to 
post a bond in this amount, it would have been forced to appeal the 
award without obtaining a stay of execution. Thus, because the to-
bacco industry could not have stayed execution, it likely would have 
been bankrupted before the case worked its way through the appel-
late courts. Fortunately for the tobacco industry, the Florida Legisla-
ture alleviated this problem with the enactment of a new statute set-
ting the maximum bond at $100 million.282 
 Even though the Florida Legislature alleviated the problem of 
bankrupting the tobacco industry during the appellate process, the 
$144.8 billion award may still violate Florida law by bankrupting the 
tobacco industry once the appellate process is completed.283 The to-
bacco industry contended during the punitive damages phase that it 
had a net worth of approximately $15 billion.284 If the tobacco indus-
try’s contentions are indeed true, enforcement of the $145 billion 
award would bankrupt the entire industry and violate Florida law. 
However, even if the tobacco industry can afford to pay the Engle 
judgment, the award should still be overturned on appeal as the 
process of assessing punitive damages under the Engle trial plan vio-
lates both Florida law on the assessment of punitive damages and 
the tobacco industry’s due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 In analyzing the process of assessing punitive damages in Engle, 
the reviewing court must determine whether the Engle court com-
plied with Haslip by placing sufficient limitations on the discretion of 
the jury.285 The Engle court started by instructing the jury that it 
could decide not to assess punitive damages.286 The court then limited 
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the discretion of the jury by instructing that the following eleven fac-
tors be considered in assessing punitive damages: 1) the amount of 
punitive damages should be reasonably related to any harm that re-
sulted or is likely to result from the tobacco industry’s actions; 2) the 
degree of reprehensibility of the industry’s actions; 3) the profitabil-
ity of the industry’s actions; 4) the financial condition of the tobacco 
industry; 5) the costs of litigation; 6) the punishment the tobacco in-
dustry will receive from other sources; 7) the hazard caused to the 
public by the industry’s actions; 8) the industry’s awareness of the 
hazard; 9) the number of employees of the industry involved in caus-
ing or covering up its actions; 10) the duration of the industry’s con-
duct; and 11) other civil awards against the tobacco industry for the 
same conduct. 287 As these factors placed reasonable limitations on the 
jury’s discretion, Engle clearly meets the standard established in 
Haslip. However, the fact that the Engle court complied with Haslip 
does not overcome the failure to protect the due process rights of the 
tobacco industry under BMW. 
 Based on the guideposts established in BMW, the degree of repre-
hensibility of the tobacco industry’s conduct must first be deter-
mined.288 In Phase I of the trial, the jury found the tobacco industry 
committed numerous reprehensible actions in its attempts to conceal 
and cover up the hazardous health consequences of smoking ciga-
rettes. 289 While the industry’s actions are not on the highest level of 
the scale of reprehensibility, such as the commission of violent 
crimes, clearly the tobacco industry’s actions are on the upper level of 
this scale. The industry simply ignored the health and safety of its 
consumers and affirmatively lied to the users of its products about 
the negative health effects of smoking. If the degree of reprehensibil-
ity had been the only guidepost enunciated by the Court, considering 
the profit motive behind the industry’s actions as an aggravating fac-
tor, the $145 billion award of punitive damages would not be consid-
ered excessive. However, while the degree of reprehensibility was 
found to be the most important guidepost, it clearly was not the only 
guidepost. 
 In the second guidepost of BMW, the Court established that the 
award of punitive damages must be compared to the actual or poten-
tial harm of the defendant’s actions. 290 Herein lies the problem with 
Engle. The courts simply cannot perform this part of the BMW test. 
At the time punitive damages were awarded, other than for three 
representative class members, there has been no showing of actual 
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damages to any individual class members. In a class that has been 
estimated at 500,000 class members, other than blatantly guessing 
at the total amount of damage caused to the class, the reviewing 
court simply has no way to compare the punitive damages award to 
compensatory damages. 
 Arguably, a court could use the $12.6 million award of compensa-
tory damages to the representative class members to estimate the 
potential harm caused by the tobacco industry. A court could also 
work backwards and determine the amount of compensatory dam-
ages that would be required to affirm the Engle award. Using the af-
firmed ratio of punitive damages from TXO, of 526 times compensa-
tory damages,291 an estimation of 500,000 Engle class members, and 
the award of $145 billion in punitive damages in Engle, a finding of 
compensatory damages in the amount of approximately $550 for each 
class member would meet the TXO standard. Surely, if all of the es-
timated 500,000 class members have injuries that were in fact 
caused by the tobacco industry, this minimal amount of compensa-
tory damages will be met. However, while it is highly likely that this 
minimal amount of compensatory damages will be easily met, such a 
comparison prior to the award of compensatory damages is pure 
guesswork. 
 Without attempting to extrapolate an acceptable amount of 
compensatory damages, the courts are left with no “standard by 
which [they] can judge whether an assessment of punitive damages 
is reasonable or is ‘grossly excessive’.”292 Because the courts cannot 
compare the actual amount of compensatory damages awarded to the 
entire Engle class to the amount of punitive damages awarded to the 
class, the courts have no realistic way to determine whether the 
award is excessive. Since the courts cannot make this determination, 
the Engle trial court’s plan for the assessment of punitive damages 
has prevented the tobacco industry from being afforded all of its due 
process rights. 
 The trial plan also violates Florida law by assessing punitive 
damages prior to a finding of liability as required by the Florida Su-
preme Court in Ault.293 While the jury found the tobacco industry was 
liable for the injuries its actions caused, this finding of general liabil-
ity to the class is not enough to allow for the assessment of punitive 
damages for the entire class. 294 There has yet to be a determination of 
                                                                                                                  
 291. The defendant in TXO was an asbestos manufacturer and may thus be considered 
similarly situated to the tobacco companies. The courts should, therefore, have no problem 
affirming a ratio of this extent. 
 292. 00-21 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 1, 8 (2000).  
 293. See Ault v. Lohr, 538 So. 2d 454, 456 (Fla. 1989). 
 294. The issue in Phase I of Engle was limited to general causation issues. See Final 
Judgment and Amended Omnibus Order, Engle v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273 
(Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2000), http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/tobacco/englerjfinaljud 
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whether any individual class member, other than the representative 
class members, was in fact injured or whether a product of the to-
bacco industry caused his or her injury. The Phase I assessment of 
liability was not so broad to mean that the tobacco industry is auto-
matically liable for the injuries of those that claim to be members of 
the class. In fact, the Phase I assessment of liability is much nar-
rower. By finding the industry liable in Phase I, the jury simply de-
termined that the tobacco industry is liable to all class members who 
later prove in their individual trial that their respective, alleged in-
juries were caused by the tobacco industry. In other words, during 
each class member’s individual trial, the issue of whether or not the 
tobacco industry generally caused injury by manipulating nicotine 
levels and concealing or misrepresenting information will not be at 
issue. However, each class member will still have to prove that he or 
she was in fact injured and that the products of the tobacco industry, 
and not something else, were the cause of his or her injury. Thus, for 
the purposes of Ault, the finding of general liability in Phase I is 
simply not sufficient to allow for the assessment of punitive damages 
for the entire class; there must still be a finding of individual liabil-
ity.  
 Without a finding of individual liability and actual damages, the 
Engle trial court has allowed a jury to establish a lump sum award of 
punitive damages without any knowledge of the extent of the injury 
caused by the tobacco industry. In fact, until the trial of all of the in-
dividual cases, it will not be known for sure how many class mem-
bers exist. While no class member will become entitled to his or her 
equal share of the punitive damages award until after proving indi-
vidual liability and actual damages, this is not sufficient to overcome 
the mandate of Ault. Ault clearly requires a finding of liability prior 
to the assessment of punitive damages.295 In setting up a method that 
allows a jury to assess punitive damages for an entire class prior to a 
finding of liability for each member of the class, the Engle court has 
violated Florida law. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 The proper procedure for the Engle trial court to follow would 
have been to follow the plan as established by the original trial judge. 
The Third District Court of Appeal, recognizing the problem in calcu-
lating damages in class actions, opined that the issue of damages 
                                                                                                                  
order.pdf. There has yet to be a finding of specific causation for any class membe r except 
the three representative class members. Without a finding of specific causation, no liability 
can be attached for harms caused to individual class members. See Ault, 538 So. 2d at 456. 
Thus, by setting punitive damages for all class members without a finding of individual li-
ability, the Engle trial plan violates the requirements of Ault. See id. 
 295. See Ault, 538 So. 2d at 456. 
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would have to be tried individually. Unfortunately, there is no rem-
edy for the current trial plan other than to wait for the appeal by the 
tobacco industry. 
 It seems almost certain that the reviewing court will reverse the 
award of lump-sum punitive damages and order that the trial court 
amend the trial plan to include individual trials on the issues of indi-
vidual causation and both compensatory and punitive damages. This 
is the only constitutional way to assess punitive damages and ensure 
that they are not grossly excessive. However, the current trial plan, 
even if reversed, will not be a total waste of time and money. 
 The large award of punitive damages is a good indicator of the fu-
ture of tobacco litigation. If the punitive damage award is in fact re-
versed on appeal, the industry may be more willing to discuss set-
tlement. After all, the prospect of litigating in the state of Florida, 
based on recent tobacco litigation in Florida, should not be terribly 
pleasing to the tobacco industry. It is even possible that breaking the 
assessment of punitive damages out into individual trials will lead, 
cumulatively, to a much larger punitive amount than the amount as-
sessed by the Engle jury. Further, given the reprehensibility of the 
actions of the tobacco industry, individual awards of punitive dam-
ages stand a better chance of being upheld on appeal, if class mem-
bers can show they were in fact injured by the tobacco industry. 
 A punitive award of $145 billion is letting the tobacco industry off 
lightly. After decades of deceit, disease, and death, the tobacco indus-
try is finally being forced to pay for its transgressions. However, the 
Florida court system should not lift the blindfold of justice and dis-
tort the law to punish the tobacco industry. Unfortunately, even 
though the tobacco industry has shown disdain for the rights of the 
people that use its products, the violation of the tobacco industry’s 
rights under both Florida law and federal constitutional law will 
likely prevent the Engle jury from bringing the tobacco industry to 
justice. Hopefully, with the advent of mounting evidence, the tide of 
this great legal battle will continue to shift and this will simply be a 
case of justice delayed and not justice denied. 
 
